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History'due south Earnest: China, India and the War of 1962

With the world's gaze fixed on Republic of cuba, India and China went to war. While the disharmonize is long since over, their relations are still a mess.

History’s Hostage: China, India and the War of 1962

Credit: Rajkumar1220 (Flickr)

50 years ago, on October twenty, 1962, with the world's terrified gaze fixed firmly on the U.Due south.-Soviet nuclear standoff in Cuba, Communist china attacked India. Provoked by a territorial dispute and tensions over Tibet, the state of war was brief and China emerged victorious. Nevertheless, the war still casts a long shadow over Sino-Indian relations and, despite substantial comeback over the years, continues to influence the bilateral relationship in 3 chief ways.

First, the war of 1962 sealed the fate of the Tibet issue as an eternal source of tension in Sino-Indian relations. Long before the state of war Tibet began to plague Beijing and Delhi's relationship as China defendant Republic of india of trying to undermine its dominion in Tibet while Republic of india charged Cathay with suppressing Tibetan autonomy. The war served to solidify those suspicions. This has had both strategic and tactical consequences.

Strategically, the Dalai Lama's presence in Republic of india, which the war made de facto irreversible, is a constant strain on Sino-Indian relations and the embodiment of the unresolved status of the Tibet upshot. For Beijing, the Dalai Lama's government in exile in Dharamsala has been a abiding challenge to its rule in Tibet. For Delhi, it has been a symbol of Beijing'south refusal to grant existent autonomy to Tibet. Information technology has besides proved a double-edged sword for India. While it has given India the and so-called "Tibet card" to play against People's republic of china, it has also boxed it in as Delhi cannot control the Tibetan leader nor throw him out for fear of the domestic and international reaction. All this has guaranteed constant tensions between the 2 Asian giants.

On a tactical level, Sino-Indian relations take been held hostage past events in Tibet and the relationship betwixt the Chinese government and the Tibetans. As C. Raja Mohan has characterized it, "When at that place is relative repose in Tibet, India and China have reasonably good relations. When Sino-Tibetan tensions rise, India's relationship with China heads south." Nonetheless, equally such tensions reflect ethnic conflicts inside Tibet, clashes between the Tibetan clergy and the local Chinese regime and the policy of the Dalai Lama, they are often across the control of Beijing and Delhi. Every bit a result, Sino-Indian relations accept become difficult to predict and more than difficult to manage in times of crisis. This inherent instability has been aggravated by a time flop which tin can explode anytime, the inevitable reincarnation of the Dalai Lama.

2d, 1962 has ancestral to China and India the border dispute that started the war and has made resolving it a Herculean task. Thus to this day China continues to claim the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, while New Delhi lays merits to the Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin territory. This dispute continues to preclude the full normalization of relations despite almost a quarter decade of negotiations and Prime Minster Vajpayee's 2003 visit to China. Despite efforts to sideline this issue it has not only remained cardinal to bilateral relations, but has powerfully reasserted itself in recent years. A series of incidents- including Indian officials visiting the disputed areas, Beijing refusing to issue visa's to Indian officers stationed in the disputed area, and official Chinese references to Arunachal Pradesh as "South Tibet"- have rekindled the dispute and led to a new wheel of accusations and tensions.

In add-on, the territorial dispute has led to dangerous militarization of the Sino-Indian border, especially in disputed areas. Both sides have built transportation infrastructure, airstrips, and outposts and accept deployed large numbers of troops to the border, including a Tibetan paramilitary special force employed past Republic of india's intelligence service. The upshot has been frequent stand up-offs and even occasional skirmishes between Indian and Chinese soldiers. Provoked past border incursions and patrolling in disputed areas, such incidents could escalate into a larger armed conflict. Earlier this twelvemonth, Cathay and India signed an agreement designed to manage tensions by establishing a mechanism for contact between the two sides in case of border incursions. However, information technology is uncertain how productive it will be in light of the failure of previous attempts to reduce tensions.

Tertiary, the border war has instilled deep mistrust and a strong sense of rivalry betwixt the ii sides.

The war of 1962 was the apex of a larger falling-out between China and India which put an stop to the honeymoon of the Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai, the Sino-Indian brotherhood. The ugly determination to the Sino-Indian brotherhood crystallized and enshrined the suspicions and stereotypes that each side held of the other. To this day, Beijing suspects that Bharat, with the help of the U.S., strives to undermine its rule in Tibet in order to balance against China's growing ability. These suspicions take only been heightened by India'due south hosting of the Dalai Lama and the recent comeback in U.S.-Indian relations.

For its part, India withal sees China every bit a nationalist, aggressive power which seeks to dominate Asia and i that might once again strike unexpectedly, just equally information technology did in 1962. Naturally, China'due south contempo assertiveness on the border result and the People'southward Liberation Army's huge military buildup bolster such fears. These stereotypes, often propagated past jingoistic media, take proved a major obstacle to edifice a strong and stable Sino-Indian relationship.

The war of 1962 has besides charged Sino-Indian relations with a strong sense of rivalry which has shaped the foreign policies of both countries. Seeking to residuum the other side, each country has forged relationships that deed every bit a counterpoint to the other; most notably, Beijing's "all weather friendship" with Islamabad and Delhi's partnership with Moscow. The rivalry has also led both sides to compete for influence in their peripheries, specially in Burma and Nepal, and to resent the spread of the other's influence close to their borders. Hence, Delhi has ofttimes obsessed over Chinese penetration in S Asia and its purported "cord of pearls" around India's maritime borders, while Beijing has resented Republic of india's growing involvement in Southeast Asia and especially in the Southward People's republic of china Sea.

Fortunately, still, the legacy of 1962 does not mean that Mainland china and India are destined to remain adversaries, as both have a lot to lose from a confrontation. An overt armed struggle between the 2 will undercut bilateral merchandise, strengthen Cathay's brotherhood with Pakistan, stir unrest in Tibet, reduce the security of both sides, and potentially push Delhi to formally align itself with Washington, forgoing the strategic autonomy that it prizes. Nor does the war's legacy mean that issues similar Tibet and the disputed border volition forever define the overall Sino-Indian relationship. Subsequently all, the expanding cooperation between the two sides and their increasing economic ties are essential parts of the Sino-Indian human relationship.

Withal, the legacy of 1962 volition probably limit the extent of the bilateral relationship between India and China in the short to medium term for a number of reasons. For example, China and India cannot build a new human relationship until they resolve some of their nigh intractable historical disputes such as the Tibet effect and the border dispute. Additionally, the inability to control these destabilizing factors ensures the human relationship volition remain unstable. Moreover, the memory of 1962 — the nationalist feelings it stirs and the suspicions it breeds — means that reaching a compromise on many cardinal bilateral issues will be very difficult. Because of the common suspicion that exists, each government fears that making concessions will be unpopular domestically. Thus deadlock is likely to prevail for the foreseeable future. Finally, the legacy of the state of war enhances the inherent competition betwixt China and India. While growing trade and cooperation mitigate this competition, a long list of factors, such as the security dilemma engendered past the militarization of disputed Sino-Indian edge, keep it alive.

In sum, nearly a half a century since the cursory war occurred, it continues to cast a long shadow over Sino-Indian relations. Wait it to continue to do so in the future.

Ivan Lidarev is a research assistant at the Center for the National Involvement.